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THE ATTORNEY AS GATEKEEPER: AN AGENDA
FOR THE SEC
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizes the SEC to prescribe
"minimum standards of professional conduct" for attorneys "appearingor
practicing"before it. Although the initial debate has focused on issues of
confidentiality, this terse statutory provisionframes and seeminglyfederalizes
a much larger question: What is the role of the corporate attorney in public
securities transactions? Is the attorney's role that of (a) an advocate, (b) a
transaction cost engineer, or, more broadly, (c) a gatekeeper-that is, a
reputationalintermediary with some responsibility to monitor the accuracy of
corporate disclosures? Skeptics of any gatekeeperrole for attorneys have long
argued that (a) such a role conflicts with the traditionalobligations of loyalty
that attorneys owe their clients, and (b) imposing gatekeeping obligationson
attorneys will chill attorney-client communications and thereby reduce law
compliance. This Essay examines these arguments that attorneys make inferior gatekeepers and replies that securities attorneys can and do perform a
limited "gatekeeping"function and that imposing such obligations on attorneys should neither chill socially desirable client communications nor reduce
the attorney's influence over the client (andprobably will increase that leverage). Finally, this Essay proposes specific standards and obligations that the
SEC might adopt to enhance the securities attorney's role as a gatekeeper.
Going beyond the current "noisy withdrawal" issue, it proposes both limited
certification and independence standards.
INTRODUCTION

The spotlight is now focused on lawyers. In the post-Enron, postSarbanes-Oxley debate over the United States's seemingly dysfunctional
system of corporate governance, Congress, the SEC, and the public at
large all suspect that, when sophisticated financial chicanery occurs, lawyers are typically present "at the scene of the crime."' So too does Professor Susan Koniak, whose contribution to this Symposium drives home the
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, and Director, Columbia
Law School Center on Corporate Governance.

1. This was said in very blunt terms by two of the principal Senatorial draftsmen of
section 307 ("Rules of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys") of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28,
and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)). Reviewing the recent scandals and explaining his
support for section 307, Senator Michael Enzi (R-Wyo.) commented: "[O]ne of the

thoughts that occurred to me was that probably in almost every transaction there was a
lawyer who drew up the documents involved in that procedure." 148 Cong. Rec. 86554
(daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi). His statement was quickly followed by
that of co-sponsor Senator Jon Corzine (D-N.J.), the former chief executive of Goldman

Sachs, who said:
In fact, in our corporate world today-and I can verify this by my own
experiences-executives and accountants work day to day with lawyers. They give
them advice on almost each and every transaction. That means when executives
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point, with the unrelenting persistence of a jackhammer, that lawyers
have behaved badly. 2 In response both to the enactment of the SarbanesOxley Act last year and to the SEC's promulgation this year of rules under
section 307 of that Act designed to force "up-the-ladder" reporting of material violations of law, 3 the bar associations themselves still seem locked
in denial. Reacting with the same shocked alacrity of a patient in the
dental chair when the drill hits an exposed nerve, they have answered:
"You don't understand; lawyers can't undertake the obligations that you
are proposing because they conflict with our duties to our clients."' 4 Evan
Davis's contribution to this Symposium is representative. A distinguished
litigator, Mr. Davis asserts that the role of the attorney is to serve as "a
bulwark between individuals or organizations and the political branches
of government."5 This view of the lawyer as the client's shield against an
oppressive state is no doubt right with respect to the role of the litigator,
but the question remains whether his description of the attorney's role
applies as well-or at all-to the securities attorney. As a result, the debate has had the character of two ships passing in the night-with neither
and accountants have been engaged in wrongdoing, there have been some other
folks at the scene of the crime-and generally they are lawyers.
Id. at S6556 (statement of Sen. Corzine).
This Essay focuses on how to change the behavior of lawyers in this position.
2. See generally Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle
With the SEC, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1236 (2003). 1 agree with many of Professor Koniak's
comments about the deficiencies in the SEC's rules under section 307, but I am not
convinced that the bar has been as corrupted as she feels it has. In any event, the relevant
question is how to structure the relationship between lawyer and client in this field to
enhance the independence, integrity, and influence of the attorney. Here I attempt to
take a wider-angled examination than she does of what the SEC could do under section
307.
3. On November 21, 2002, the SEC proposed rules under section 307 of the SarbanesOxley Act to mandate "up-the-ladder" reporting. See Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8150, 67 Fed. Reg.
71,670 (Dec. 2, 2002). On January 23, 2003, the Committee voted to approve an up-theladder reporting system under which attorneys must report evidence of material violations
of certain laws to the corporation's chief legal officer and, when that attorney fails to
respond appropriately, to the corporation's audit committee. See Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, 68
Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). However, the
Commission delayed for further review its original proposal that mandated attorney
resignation and a report to the SEC when the corporate client refused to correct or rectify
an ongoing material violation of law that threatened serious injury to the corporation or its
security holders. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Securities Act Release No. 33-8186, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003).
4. In a December 18, 2002 letter from American Bar Association President Alfred P.
Carlton, Jr. to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the ABA expressed its view that
the SEC's proposed rules would "adversely affect issuers' ability to obtain sound legal
advice." Comments of American Bar Association on Proposed Rule: Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys (Dec. 18, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s74502/apcarltonl.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
5. See Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
1281, 1281 (2003).
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side truly engaging the claims of the other. Both sides are shocked-in
the one case about attorney misconduct, in the other about regulatory
intrusions into the quiet world of the professions-but neither side has
focused fully on the scope of the transformation of the legal profession
that the SEC could effect under section 307.
The SEC has also contributed to the nonconceptual character of the
current debate. Understandably eager to minimize controversy, it has
presented its up-the-ladder reporting rules under section 307 as intended
to protect only the attorney's client, the corporation. Yet, particularly in
the case of the SEC's proposals for a "noisy withdrawal" obligation, this is
disingenuous. The real issue is: To what degree can or should the securities
attorney serve as a gatekeeper with guardian-like responsibilitiesto investors who
rely upon the disclosures that the securities attorney typically prepares or at least
reviews. Because the bar associations simply deny that attorneys have (or
should have) any mandatory gatekeeper obligations, 6 and because the
SEC finds it impolitic to assert that they do (even as they indirectly impose them), this debate has not yet fully been joined. Yet this debate

6. The American Bar Association has historically favored the "hired gun" model of the
attorney under which even the securities attorney generally has no duty or right to make
disclosure, absent the client's consent. See American Bar Association, Statement of Policy
Adopted by the American Bar Association Regarding Responsibilities and Liabilities of
Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by Clients with Laws Administered by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 Bus. Law. 543, 545 (1975) [hereinafter ABA
Statement of Policy] ("[T]he lawyer has neither the obligation nor the right to make
disclosure when any reasonable doubt exists concerning the client's obligation of
disclosure.").
Even the American Bar Association's Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, which
earlier this year recommended some loosening of lawyer confidentiality rules, has shied
away from endorsing any gatekeeping role for lawyers. In its 2003 Final Report, it stated:
"The Task Force acknowledges that lawyers for the corporation-whether employed by the
corporation or specially retained-are not 'gatekeepers' of corporate responsibility in the
same fashion as public accounting firms." See Report of the American Bar Association
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility at 22 (March 31, 2003), available at http://www.
abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final_report.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility]. This is of course a
nuanced statement that does not necessarily deny that lawyers could have some
gatekeeping responsibilities, although not the same as auditors. The rationale for this
view is expressed later in the same paragraph of this report:
Except in clearly defined circumstances in which other considerations take
precedence, an alternative view of the lawyer as an enforcer of law may tend to
create an atmosphere of adversity, or at least arm's length dealing, between the
lawyer and the corporate client's senior executive officers that is inimical to the
lawyer's essential role as a counselor promoting the corporation's compliance
with law.
Id. at 23. As discussed later, this assertion seems overboard-both in its implicit claim that
any gatekeeping responsibility will lead to an "atmosphere of adversity" and, even more so,
in its assumption that imposing such a responsibility on lawyers will be "inimical to
promoting the corporation's compliance with law." For a contrary view, see text and notes
infra at notes 41-50.
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must ultimately focus on how much the role of the attorney should
change, at least in the case of the securities lawyer.
Clearly, nontrivial arguments can be advanced that securities attorneys will not make good gatekeepers. Chiefly, skeptics object either that
(1) the responsibilities of a gatekeeper conflict with the traditional obligations of loyalty that attorneys owe to their clients, or (2) imposing
gatekeeping obligations on attorneys will chill attorney-client communications that also serve to promote law compliance. In response, this brief
Essay will reply that: (1) securities attorneys have long recognized gatekeeper-like obligations (and thus differ from their litigator colleagues in
a profession that is considerably more heterogenous than is generally recognized); (2) the differences between attorneys and auditors are less fundamental and more marginal than opponents of the SEC's proposed
noisy withdrawal standard have recognized; (3) in some respects, it may
be easier to impose gatekeeper obligations on attorneys than on auditors;
and (4) imposing gatekeeper obligations on attorneys is likely neither to
chill socially desirable client communications nor to reduce attorneys' influence over their clients, but may actually increase attorneys' leverage
over their most intransigent clients. Finally, this Essay will examine the
critical question that the SEC has not yet begun to consider: Now that
the SEC has the power to promulgate "minimum standards of professional conduct" for securities attorneys under section 307, what standards
make sense if we believe it necessary that the legal profession assume
some responsibility as a guardian of the market's integrity? It will propose some other obligations that could overshadow and prove more beneficial to investors than a duty of noisy withdrawal.
I.

WHAT

IS

A GATEKEEPER?

The term "gatekeeper" has frequently been used to describe the independent professionals who serve investors by preparing, verifying, or
assessing the disclosures that they receive. 7 Examples of gatekeepers include: (1) the auditor who provides its certification that the issuer's financial statements comply with generally accepted accounting principles;
(2) the debt rating agency that evaluates the issuer's creditworthiness; (3)
the securities analyst who communicates an assessment of the corporation's technology, competitiveness, or earnings prospects; (4) the investment banker who furnishes its "fairness opinion" as to the pricing of a
merger; and (5) the securities attorney for the issuer who delivers an
opinion to the underwriters that all material information of which the
7. The SEC regularly uses the term "gatekeeper." See, e.g., Revision of the
Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 33-7870,
65 Fed. Reg. 43,148, 43,150 Uuly 12, 2000) (noting that "the federal securities laws ...
make independent auditors 'gatekeepers' to the public securities markets"); Securities Act
Concepts and Their Effects on Capital Formation, Securities Act Release No. 33-7314, 61
Fed. Reg. 40,044, 40,048-49 (July 25, 1996) (discussing the role of gatekeepers in
maintaining the quality of disclosure).
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attorney is aware concerning the issuer has been disclosed properly. The
underwriter in an initial public offering also performs a gatekeeping
function, in the sense that its reputation is implicitly pledged and it is
expected to perform due diligence services.
Structurally, gatekeepers are independent professionals who are so
positioned that, if they withhold their consent, approval, or rating, the
corporation may be unable to effect some transaction or to maintain
some desired status. 8 For example, institutional investors may be able to
purchase the corporation's bonds only if an independent debt-rating
agency rates them as being of investment grade. 9 Similarly, a "clean"
opinion from an auditor may be required by stock exchanges and the
SEC if the corporation is to remain publicly traded. From a law compliance perspective, the existence of the gatekeeper offers an effective strategy for deterrence. Because the gatekeeper will receive little, if anything,
from corporate involvement in crime or misconduct, it can be deterred
more easily than can the corporation or its managers, who may profit
handsomely from crime or who may be tempted to engage in criminal
activities to achieve goals or thresholds that allow them to remain in
office.
The gatekeeper's relative credibility derives in part from its lesser
incentive to lie or dissemble, but even more so from the fact that the
gatekeeper in effect pledges reputational capital that it has built up over
many years and many clients to secure its representations about the particular client or transaction. 10 At least in theory, a gatekeeper would not
rationally sacrifice this reputational capital for a single client who ac8. Professor Reinier Kraakman originally defined "gatekeepers" as private parties who
were able to prevent corporate misconduct by withholding their cooperation from
wrongdoers. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2J.L. Econ. & Org. 53, 54 (1986); see also Reinier H. Kraakman,
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L.J. 857, 888-96
(1984) (evaluating gatekeeper liability).
9. A debt rating agency must be recognized by the SEC as a "nationally recognized
statistical rating organization" (NRSRO) before its ratings carry meaningful consequences.
Thus, the SEC has de facto licensing control over this form of gatekeeper. See Rule 15c3I (c) (2) (vi) (E), (F), & (H) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15(c)(3)-1 (2001) (requiring certain debt securities to carry an investment grade
rating from an NRSRO if securities are to be assigned value in computing broker-dealer's
net capital). The term "investment grade" was originally used by a variety of regulatory
bodies in the United States to describe debt obligations that they deemed eligible for
investment by institutions such as banks, insurance companies, and savings and loan
institutions. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating
Agency Paradox, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 6-8 (describing process by which determination of
investment grade status came to be delegated to private bodies).
10. The idea that a gatekeeper is an "informational intermediary" whose presence or
certification makes the issuer's representations credible was probably first articulated by
Professors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman with respect to underwriters. See Ronald
J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev.
549, 618-21 (1984).
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counts for only a small portion of its revenues. II Attorneys resemble gatekeepers in that they usually have reputational capital and are often in a
position to block or delay transactions or governmental approvals that are
vital to their corporate clients. This is truest in the case of securities attorneys, who could potentially block the effectiveness of a registration statement or the consummation of a merger simply by signaling their displeasure to the SEC. In the past, the SEC has suggested strongly that the
attorney who is aware of a disclosure violation has a duty to seek to block
or delay the consummation of any transaction, at least until properly-informed shareholder approval is obtained. 12 At times (although inconsistently), the SEC has even said that the attorney has an affirmative obliga13
tion to cause the client to comply with the federal securities laws.
Historically, bar associations have resisted these SEC pronouncements, insisting that attorneys owe no mandatory obligations to public
5
investors.' 4 The securities bar has, however, been far more equivocal.'
Although litigators have often asserted (as Evan Davis does in this Symposium) that lawyers owe a duty only to their clients and cannot assume
other responsibilities, prominent securities attorneys have long endorsed
the idea that they owe a duty to the investor who relies on their work11. For a strong (and probably overstrong) statement of this view that gatekeepers will
not acquiesce in fraud, see DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook, J.) ("It would have been irrational for any of them [the auditors] to have
joined cause with [the client]."). For a critique of this view, see Robert A. Prentice, The
Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95
Nw. U. L. Rev. 133, 218-19 (2000).
12. This was the SEC's central claim in National Student Marketing. See SEC v. Nat'l
Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 700-01 (D.D.C. 1978) (upholding SEC's claim that
attorney who failed to act in this fashion aided and abetted client's fraud).
13. The high water mark in the Commission's statements about the obligations of an
attorney to cause a corporate client to comply with the securities laws was probably its
decision in In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
82,847, at 84,170 (Mar. 25, 1981) (finding a lawyer "must make all efforts within reason to
persuade his client to avoid or terminate proposed illegal action"). The Commission
quickly retreated from this position. See infra note 30.
14. See ABA Statement of Policy, supra note 6, at 544; ABA Section of Corp., Banking
and Bus. Law, SEC Standard of Conduct for Lawyers: Comments on the SEC Rule
Proposal, 37 Bus. Law. 915, 922-23 (1982) (criticizing SEC decision in In re Carter that
attorney owed duty to take prompt action to cause corporate client to comply with
securities laws). Both statements were approved by the ABA's Board of Governors. The
ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, which reported earlier this year, also skirted
around endorsing any gatekeeper role for attorneys. See supra note 6 and accompanying
text.
15. A considerable body of literature has discussed the conceptions that corporate
lawyers have of themselves. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a
Public Calling, 49 Md. L. Rev. 255, 258 (1990); see also Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution
of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 Md. L. Rev. 869, 884 (1990) ("The
lawyer functions 'as a kind of buffer between the illegitimate desires of his client and the
social interest."'). One commentator has noted that the bar has long divided between two
competing visions of the attorney: (1) the "hired gun" or "total commitment" model; and
(2) the gatekeeper model. Paul G. Haskell, Why Lawyers Behave as They Do 85-86 (1998).

2003]

THE ATYORNEY AS GATEKEEPER

1299

one that requires them to be skeptical of, and independent from, their
client. A classic expression of this view was stated in 1974 by A.A. Sommer, Jr., a long-time leader of the securities bar and at the time an SEC
Commissioner. In a speech entitled, "The Emerging Responsibilities of
the Securities Lawyer," he succinctly summarized the key elements of this
duty:
I would suggest that in securities matters (other than those
where advocacy is clearly proper) the attorney will have to function in a manner more akin to that of auditor than to that of the
attorney. This means several things. It means that he will have
to exercise a measure of independence that is perhaps uncomfortable if he is also the close counselor of management in other
matters, often including business decisions. It means he will
have to be acutely cognizant of his responsibility to the public
who engage in securities transactions that would never have
come about were it not for his professional presence. It means
that he will have to adopt the healthy skepticism toward the representation of management which a good auditor must adopt.
does
It means that he will have to do the same thing the auditor
16
when confronted with an intransigent client-resign.
In overview, Sommer's definition of the securities attorney's ethical responsibilities stresses precisely the elements that define a gatekeeper: (1)
independence from the client; (2) professional skepticism of the client's
representations;1 7 (3) a duty to the public investor; and (4) a duty to
resign when the attorney's integrity would otherwise be compromised.
Of course, other securities attorneys might well disagree with Commissioner Sommer, and his commanding presence in the field does not
prove that his policy analysis is inherently correct. But even an ambivalence on the part of securities attorneys about their gatekeeper role contrasts sharply with the unqualified assertions of litigators that attorneys
are essentially advocates. The litigators' certainty seems attributable to a
"center-of-the-universe" fallacy under which litigators assume that their
experience and their typical relationships with clients also necessarily
characterize the experiences of other branches of the bar.

16. A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, Address
to the Banking, Corporation & Business Law Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n (Jan. 24, 1974),
in Larry D. Soderquist & Theresa Gabaldon, Securities Regulation 617-19 (4th ed. 1999).
For another analysis of the corporate lawyer's "public" obligations, see also Simon M.
Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the Public Interest, and Professional Ethics,
76 Mich. L. Rev. 423, 468-96 (1978).
17. The late Harvard Law School Professor Louis Loss, the unquestioned dean of
securities law academics before his death, similarly took the position that the securities
lawyer's job inherently involved asking "searching questions" of the client about its
proposed disclosures. See Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities
Regulation 1384 (4th ed. 2001).
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WHAT HAPPENED TO GATEKEEPERS DURING THE

1990s

A 2002 study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that
approximately ten percent of all publicly listed U.S. companies restated
their financial statements at least once between 1997 and June 2002.18
The GAO study also shows that the annual rate of financial restatements
soared between 1997 and 2002.19
FIGURE
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This sudden spike in financial restatements strongly suggests that auditors became compromised during the 1990s and acquiesced in risky
and questionable accounting policies favored by corporate managements. 20 But auditors were neither the only profession that dealt with
financial disclosures nor the only profession that seemed to have become
compromised during the 1990s. Securities analysts present an even
clearer case in which conflicts of interest caused once cautious and objective analysts to behave more like cheerleaders than neutral umpires, at
least when the corporation under review was an underwriting client of
the investment banking firm that employed them. 2 1 Both quantitative
18. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Financial Statement Restatements: Trends,
Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining Challenges 4-5, GAO-03-138 (Oct.
2002) (report to the Chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs). Specifically, the GAO study finds that there were 919 announced restatements
over the period from 1997 to June 2002, involving some 845 different companies, which
constitutes ten percent of all those listed.
19. Id. at 15.
20. This author has elsewhere made the case in more detail that during the 1990s
auditors became compromised by a combination of reduced legal risks for acquiescing in
financial irregularities and heightened benefits that corporate managements could bestow
on acquiescent auditors in the form of highly lucrative consulting work. See John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid", 57 Bus. Law. 1403,
1409-16 (2002).
21. For a general overview of this scandal, which was largely brought to the public's
attention by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, see Gretchen Morgenson, Requiem
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and qualitative data suggest that the behavior and incentives of securities
22
analysts changed during the 1990s.
Responding to these problems with both auditors and analysts,
Sarbanes-Oxley sought to restore the independence of both gatekeepers
by different strategies. In the case of auditors, Congress decreed a divorce, separating the consultant role from the auditing role in order to
preclude the possibility that management could bribe auditors into acquiescence with lucrative consulting contracts. 23 In the case of analysts, it
authorized the SEC to engage in broad rulemaking designed to "address
conflicts of interest that can arise when securities analysts recommend
'24
equity securities .. .in order to improve the objectivity of research.
This leaves the attorney as the lone remaining agent with responsibilities for the disclosure process who has not yet been subjected to prophylactic rules affecting its professional structure or independence. To be
sure, Sarbanes-Oxley did not ignore attorneys, but it was less certain
about how to treat them. Section 307 authorizes the SEC to promulgate
"minimum standards of professional conduct" for attorneys appearing or
practicing before the SEC. In their statements in the Congressional Record, the Senate co-sponsors of section 307 clearly expressed their view
that attorneys were at least as implicated as auditors and investment bankers in the financial and accounting irregularities that produced the collapses of Enron, WorldCom, et al. 25 Although the only specific reform
mandated by section 307 was up-the-ladder reporting, the breadth of the
for an Honorable Profession, N.Y. Times, May 5, 2002, § 3, at 1 (concluding that major
changes in the profession date from around 1996).
22. Professors Hong and Kubik find that optimism was more important than accuracy
during the 1990s in predicting a security analyst's advancement within the industry.
Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik, Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased
Earnings Forecasts, 58 J. Fin. 313, 345-46 (2003); see also Roni Michaely & Kent L.
Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst
Recommendations, 12 Rev. Fin. Stud. 653, 680 (1999) (finding that analysts employed by
underwriting firms behaved differently-and less accurately-than independent analysts).
Another source of evidence is the marked shift in the ratio of buy to sell
recommendations made by analysts; a study by Thompson Financial First Call found this
ratio rose from 6:1 in 1990 to 100:1 in 2000. The same study further found that less than
one percent of the 28,000 stock recommendations issued by brokerage firm analysts during
late 1999 and most of 2000 were sell recommendations. See Hearing on Analyzing the
Analysts: Are Investors Getting Unbiased Research from Wall Street?: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't-Sponsored Enters., 107th Cong. 1
(2001) (opening statement of Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski, Ranking Democratic Member)
(discussing this study).
23. Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits accounting firms from providing
a variety of non-audit services to an audit client that is a publicly held company. This
section of the Act has been codified as Section 1OA(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 15 U.S.C.A. 78j-1(g) (West Supp. 2003). The conflict of interest that arises when
accounting firms offer both consulting and auditing services is discussed further infra at
notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
24. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 501, which has been codified as a new section 15D to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6.
25. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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phrase "minimum standards of professional conduct" sweeps far more
broadly and easily could encompass other, potentially more extensive
gatekeeping duties, at least to the extent that any such duty can be fairly
characterized as a "minimum standard of professional conduct."
The issue then is whether law is a sufficiently distinctive profession
that attorneys should be treated differently from auditors and analysts,
whose objectivity and independence Sarbanes-Oxley expressly sought to
upgrade. Plausible arguments can, of course, always be made that every
profession is different. Balanced against these attempts to distinguish the
legal profession, however, is a countervailing consideration: Can investor
confidence in our equity markets be restored without imposing on attorneys, the professionals typically having the principal role in the drafting
of disclosure documents, some greater responsibility for protecting the
integrity of the disclosure process? If not, the social cost of exempting
attorneys from gatekeeping responsibilities would include a higher cost
of equity capital for corporate issuers, more reliance upon debt and resulting higher corporate leverage, and reduced economic growth; all
these potential costs are impossible to measure with any precision, but
nonetheless their macroeconomic impact would be real and adverse.
III. CAN ATToRNEYs BE GATEKEEPERS?
How are attorneys different from more classic gatekeepers, such as
auditors? Two differences are usually identified.
First, attorneys are not predominantly gatekeepers, as are, in theory,
auditors and analysts. Rather, they play multiple roles with respect to the
corporate client: (1) advocate; (2) transaction engineer; and (3) disclosure supervisor-or gatekeeper. Critics of the SEC's proposed rules have
been quick to assert that imposing gatekeeper-like duties on the attorney
would compromise the attorney's loyalty to the client, thereby subordi26
nating the attorney's primary role to the secondary role of gatekeeper.
Second, public policy has uniquely favored free and open communications between the attorney and the client, deeming them to be legally
privileged in order to maximize the incentive for the client to communicate freely with the attorney. Once again, critics assert that such communications will "dry up" under the SEC's proposed rules on noisy withdrawal, with the result that the end goal of law compliance could actually
be impeded because of reduced communications.
A third and countervailing consideration must also be noted: The
other principal gatekeepers are each regulated today by a public body
that at least in theory seeks to protect the interests of the public. For
example, after Sarbanes-Oxley, auditors are regulated by the Public Com26. For a good statement of this position, see Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is
There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 Vill. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/delivery.cfm/SSRNID367661_code030
213500.pdPabstractid =367661 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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pany Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which is charged expressly
with setting ethical standards for auditors,2 7 while securities analysts are
subject to regulation by the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as self-regulatory
bodies monitored by the SEC, and by the SEC itself. Only attorneys stand
apart, regulated by private state bar associations. Such guild-like regulation has little incentive to be aggressive, to fund enforcement, or to place
the interests of the public above those of its members (as the SEC has
complained) .28
A. The Multiple Roles of Attorneys
For the sake of argument, let us assume that business lawyers are
primarily transaction engineers, who only secondarily oversee the disclosure process. How real is the conflict between these two roles? Unsurprisingly, it has long been the law that an attorney who knowingly files a
false disclosure document with the SEC can be held liable by that agency
as an "aider and abetter" of the primary violation by the corporate client. 29 Thus, some obligation to play a gatekeeper role already exists.
The major difference between current law and a noisy withdrawal obligation is that today an attorney arguably could stand aside and not object
when the issuer made a disclosure violation of which the attorney was
aware but did not actively assist. 30 If a noisy withdrawal were mandated,
27. Section 101 (a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act empowers the PCAOB "to oversee the
audit of public companies that are subject to the securities laws ... in order to protect the
interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative,
accurate and independent audit reports." 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(a) (West Supp. 2003).
28. In his 2002 speech before the American Bar Association, then SEC Chairman
Harvey Pitt expressed frustration over "the generally low level of effective responses we
receive from state bar committees when we refer possible disciplinary proceedings to
them." Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association's Business Law Section (Aug. 12, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch579.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Criticism of state bar enforcement of
ethical rules is not new. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode, The Legal
Profession: Responsibility and Regulation 484-87 (2d ed. 1988) ("Disciplinary action is
practically nonexistent in many jurisdictions ....").
29. See, e.g., SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding SEC "aiding and
abetting" action against an attorney).
30. In In re Carter & Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,847, 84,145 (Mar. 25, 1981), the SEC announced that a lawyer who is aware of serious
and continuing violations of law by a corporate client has an obligation to "take[ ] prompt
steps to end the cl[i]ent's noncompliance." However, the SEC retreated one year later
from this aggressive stance when its general counsel indicated that in the future the
Commission would exercise greater prosecutional restraint in bringing administrative
proceedings under SEC Rule 102(e) and would bring such proceedings generally only
when a court had previously determined that the lawyer had violated the federal securities
laws. See Edward F. Greene, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Remarks to the New York County Lawyers' Association (Jan. 13,
1982), in 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 168 (1982). This position was later adopted by the
Commission itself in Disciplinary Proceedings Involving Professionals Appearing or
Practicing Before the Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 34-25893, 53 Fed. Reg.
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however, at least some instances would arise in which the attorney could
not remain passive without violating this rule. Thus, the conflict already
exists, but, in fairness, it would be exacerbated by subjecting the attorney
to gatekeeper duties.
Still, other professions also perform multiple roles-or at least did
until recently. Immediately prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley,
one survey found that the "Big Five" auditing firms received, on average,
more than three times as much in consulting income from their audit
clients as they received from them in audit fees. 31 Obviously, this imbalance reduces the incentive of the auditor to detect or report violations of
law if such conduct could cause the audit firm to forfeit even more lucrative consulting revenues. 3 2 Economically then, the auditor had at least as
much disincentive to blow the whistle on a major client.
Similarly, the securities analyst is an employee within a larger investment banking firm, whose compensation and advancement within the
firm appears to correlate closely with publishing highly favorable and optimistic research about underwriting clients of the firm.3 3 Again, the investment banking firm has multiple relationships with the corporate client that compromise the objectivity of its analysts' recommendations.
Of course, Sarbanes-Oxley has restricted such conflicts in the case of
the auditor and the analyst. Yet, precisely for this reason, reformers
could logically propose a corresponding structural reform for the attorney: To prevent conflicts that compromise the attorney, a corporation
might be required to use different counsel for "transaction engineering"
tasks than it used for "gatekeeping responsibilities." That is, the corporation could use one law firm to plan and structure a merger and another
to handle all disclosure responsibilities pertaining to the merger.3 4 To be
26,427 (July 13, 1988) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 2a). The Commission's retreat
effectively ended SEC disciplinary actions against lawyers. See Robert W. Emerson, Rule
2(e) Revisited: SEC Disciplining of Attorneys Since In Re Carter, 29 Am. Bus. L.J. 156, 213
(1991) (noting that virtually all subsequent Rule 102(e) proceedings against lawyers were
preceded by a federal court finding of a securities law violation).
31. See Janet Kidd Stewart & Andrew Countryman, Local Audit Conflicts Add Up:
Consulting Deals, Hiring Practices in Question, Chi. Trib., Feb. 24, 2002, at Cl (surveying
the one hundred largest corporations in the Chicago area in terms of how they
compensated their auditors and the breakdown between audit and consulting fees).
Probably, the focus should not be on the average ratio, but on the extreme cases. This
study found one large corporate issuer (Motorola) that had more than a 16:1 ratio
between the consulting fees and the audit fees it paid to its auditor. Id.
32. Even more importantly, the client could silently cancel or revoke consulting
relationships and revenues if the auditor exhibited excessive integrity in resisting
questionable accounting policies. In contrast, firing the auditor is a dangerous strategy
because of SEC disclosure rules that permit the auditor to explain the nature of its
disagreement with the client. See Coffee, supra note 20, at 1411-12.
33. See Hong & Kubik, supra note 22, at 345-46 (finding optimism appears to be
more important than accuracy in predicting analyst's advancement).
34. This proposal would require the "transaction engineer" law firm to review the
disclosures prepared by the "gatekeeper" counsel and consult with the latter in order that
the corporate management not be able to blind the gatekeeper, who would be less familiar
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sure, this would involve costly duplicative and redundant work. But cost
considerations are not necessarily dispositive. For example, in preventing
the auditor from serving its client as a consultant, Sarbanes-Oxley may
have also precluded the corporate client from similarly realizing cost-efficient synergies. The difference between the auditor and the attorney is
then one of degree, not of kind. In all likelihood, the synergies in permitting one law firm to serve as both transaction engineer and disclosure
counsel are greater than the synergies in permitting an auditor also to
serve as a software consultant. Still, this is debatable on a case-by-case
basis. In short, those who point to the multiple roles played by the attorney as a reason for not holding attorneys responsible as gatekeepers are
making the same argument unsuccessfully made by auditors prior to
Sarbanes-Oxley's severance of auditing from consulting. Possibly, a complete divorce of these multiple (and potentially conflicting) roles is less
feasible in the case of attorneys, but if so, this may only suggest that other,
less restrictive means of dealing with the same conflicts need to be found.
As this Essay suggests, section 307 offers a path to this end.
In some respects, it may even be easier to impose gatekeeper obligations on the attorney than on the auditor. The individual audit partner
often has a "one client" practice, at least when the audit partner serves a
large firm (such as Enron). Lose that client, and the partner probably
has no future with his or her firm. Although a "one client" practice is
also possible in the case of partners in a law firm, this pattern has become
far less common. General counsel have learned to move their legal business around to foster price competition among law firms; increasingly,
recurring and/or less specialized activities are cheaper for the corporate
client to internalize by moving such services "in house. '35 In short, because corporations make the same "make or buy" decision with respect to
legal services as they do with respect to other commodities and services,
the law firm partner has increasingly become a specialist-one with high
reputational capital who markets his or her services to multiple clients
(for example, the mergers and acquisitions or bankruptcy specialist who
typically has a "one shot" relationship with the corporate client and then
moves on to the next client). In contrast, neither the auditor nor the
investment banking firm has the same "one shot," nonrecurring relationship with its corporate clients that law firms increasingly have. In overview, this "one shot" relationship is precisely the profile of the profeswith the transaction. The "transaction" counsel would, of course, be subject to a duty to
report up the ladder if it detected a material error and could not resolve the matter with
disclosure counsel. Although this proposal is, of course, unlikely to be adopted because of
its costs, it is intended primarily as a heuristic example of the type of reforms that follow
once we recognize that attorneys sometimes perform a role functionally similar to that of
auditors. The more practical alternative to use of dual counsel is attorney certification.
See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
35. For an overview of these developments, see generally Ronald J. Gilson, The
Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 Md. L. Rev. 869
(1990).
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sional who can best serve as a gatekeeper, because the professional
remains more independent of the client and suffers less from a single
36
client's dismissal.
Nonetheless, some argue that the attorney's mindset as an advocate
for the client blinds the attorney to signs of illegality. 37 But this only begs
the real question: Compared to whom? The auditor or the investment
banker has little expertise in spotting or identifying violations of law,
while the attorney is far more capable of detecting them. Although it
may be true that the attorney does not want to find legal violations, why is
that a defense? The more we suspect that attorneys will avert their gaze,
the more we need to raise the penalties to deter them from so doing.
The claim that auditors make good gatekeepers and attorneys bad
ones is also undercut by the limited empirical evidence. Since the passage of the Private Securities Law Reform Act in 1995, auditors have been
under a statutory obligation to report to the SEC any material violations
of law that they uncover in the course of their work for publicly held
corporate clients. 38 The evidence to date suggests that they have reported such violations on very few occasions.3 9 This could conceivably be
read to mean that there have been very few such violations to report or,
more realistically, that human beings predictably will rationalize and find
36. Yet for this same reason it becomes apparent that the corporation's general
counsel is unlikely to make a satisfactory gatekeeper, because the inside general counsel
has by definition a "one client" practice.
37. For the argument that there are cognitive constraints on the corporate attorney
that cause the attorney to overlook fraud, see Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the
Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 Vand. L.
Rev. 75, 95 (1993).
38. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (b) (1) (2000)
(specifying steps that an independent public accountant must take when it "detects or
otherwise becomes aware of information indicating that an illegal act (whether or not
perceived to have a material effect on the financial statements of the issuer) has or may
have occurred"). Section 10A's coverage is far broader than that of the SEC's rules under
section 307, because it requires the auditor to respond even to apparently immaterial
illegal acts.
39. Richard Walker, then the Director of the SEC's Enforcement Division, told an
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) National Conference in 1999
that the SEC had received fewer than a dozen Section 10A reports since that section was
enacted as part of the PSLRA in 1995. Richard H. Walker, Behind the Numbers of the
SEC's Recent Financial Fraud Cases, Remarks Before the 27th Annual National AICPA
Conference on Current SEC Developments (Dec. 7, 1999), at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/speecharchive/1999/ spch334.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Addressing the same conference a year later, Walker noted that his "concern remain [ed].
We have received only a handful of additional reports-fewer than five-during the past
year." Richard H. Walker, Remarks Before the AICPA National Conference on Current
SEC Developments (Dec. 5, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch447.htm (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). Mr. Walker concluded that this low response rate
suggested that auditors were "failing to fulfill their 10A responsibilities." Id; see also Darin
Bartholomew, Is Silence Golden When It Comes to Auditing?, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 57,
93-94 (2002) (giving specific examples of auditors' failures to report illegal acts according
to their 10A obligations).
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reasons for avoiding what is not in their self-interest to do. Both attorneys
and auditors are subject to this same urge, and hence generalizing the
obligation to report so that it applies to the attorney as well as the auditor
increases the chance that material violations will come to light. Also,
from a deterrence perspective, the corporate client may be more apprehensive that the attorney will report than that the auditor will, either because the attorney may be perceived as more law-abiding or because the
attorney is simply better at spotting law violations.
B. Attorney-Client Communications
The most important argument against imposing gatekeeper obligations on securities attorneys is that attorneys may be less able to communicate freely with their clients if such obligations-and, in particular, a
noisy withdrawal requirement-were imposed. In response to this claim,
it is first necessary to recognize that the ultimate goal of the law is to
achieve law compliance, not to maximize uninhibited communications
between the attorney and the client. Client confidentiality is a means to
an end, not an end in itself. Thus, the law has long placed some limitations on attorney-client communications (such as the crime/fraud
exception) .40
Still, even with this concession, it remains true that lawyers can counsel most effectively when there is open, relatively unconstrained communication between their clients and themselves. 4 1 Hence, the practical issue becomes whether gatekeeper obligations would necessarily chill
desirable attorney-client communications. The stress here should be on
the word "desirable." What would be the likely impact of the SEC's proposed noisy withdrawal standards on such communications? A starting
point for this analysis should be the recognition that the client knows
little law and will almost always want to know if contemplated action is
illegal. From this premise, it follows that the corporate official contemplating prospective action will still inquire of counsel whether the course
of action under consideration is lawful. Indeed, the more the government pursues white-collar criminal prosecutions and punitive regulatory
actions in the contemporary post-Enron environment, the more likely it is
40. Some believe that prosecutors have already so expanded the "crime/fraud
exception" to the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context as to make the
existence of the privilege uncertain. See, e.g., David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On
the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal
Investigations, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 147, 153-58 (2000) (describing government efforts to
get corporations under investigation to waive privilege). But see In re Richard Roe, Inc.,
168 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1999) (defining crime/fraud exception more narrowly than
prosecutors requested). Given this uncertainty, those who predict a sudden decrease in
lawyer-client communications following the adoption of any noisy withdrawal rule have
some obligation to explain why it has not already occurred.
41. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1981) (recognizing the
importance of candid dialogue between corporate officers and counsel in defining the
scope of the attorney-client privilege).
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that corporate officers will consult counsel before acting. When, then,
will communications be most likely to be chilled? The logical answer is
that the officer who has already acted may fear inquiring of an attorney if
the officer's conduct was lawful-precisely because the officer fears that
the attorney may be under an obligation to report unlawful actions to
higher authorities or, indirectly, to the SEC. In short, it is the ex post
inquiry by the client of the attorney that is most likely to be chilled.
If one accepts this premise that ex ante communications between
counsel and the client are less likely to be chilled than ex post communications, several implications follow. First, the impact of imposing gatekeeper obligations on attorneys may be socially desirable. In a wellknown article, Professors Kaplow and Shavell have argued that the case
for protecting ex ante communications between attorneys and clients is
far stronger than the case for protecting ex post communications. 4 2 Advice before action leads individuals to comply with the law, they argue,
whereas ex post advice does not provide a guide for action; rather, it may
simply allow the defendant to discuss defense strategies and means of
evasion, thereby reducing the expected penalty costs and encouraging
illegality. It is not necessary to accept fully the Kaplow and Shavell analysis, which might limit the attorney-client privilege to ex ante advice, to see
that its core distinction between ex ante and ex post advice suggests that
we should be more concerned about chilling ex ante communications
between attorney and client. Yet this is not what most gatekeeper obligations do; rather, they may induce such communications by making ex
post advice less possible.
Second, requiring noisy withdrawals and up-the-ladder reporting
also has a deterrent value that is independent of this issue of whether the
initial corporate actor will still consult counsel. Few significant actions
within a corporation can be taken by a single actor. 43 Decisions made by
one person still need to be implemented by others. Thus, even after the
initial corporate actor has taken an irrevocable step (and will thereafter
be arguably less willing to consult with counsel ex post), other corporate
actors must be convinced to cooperate with the initial actor. They will
have every incentive to consult with counsel because they are still at the
ex ante stage. In turn, knowledge that others are necessarily likely to
learn of the original actor's conduct and then to consult with counsel
about its legality may deter the original actor. The modern public corpo42. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in
Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 565, 597-99 (1989)
(suggesting ex ante advice promotes law compliance, while ex post advice does not); see
also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev.
1477, 1531-33 (1999).
43. This point was made by Senator Corzine when he co-sponsored section 307. See
supra note I and accompanying text. Within the modern corporation, lawyers are always
being consulted by someone, and the fact that multiple actors consult them implies that a
wrongdoer cannot anticipate that his or her own silence will prevent the organization's
lawyers from learning of the conduct in question.

20031

THE ATTORNEY AS GATEKEEPER

1309

ration is embedded with in-house attorneys, and even the possibility that
they will report up the ladder should deter some illegal conduct. Accordingly, even if under some conditions there may be less direct communication between corporate actors and counsel, the knowledge that sooner or
later counsel is likely to learn ex post (because of the multiple parties
likely to consult counsel) may still deter corporate actors ex ante.
Third, this ex ante/ex post distinction also helps clarify when exceptions may need to be created to any obligation on the part of the attorney
to report out information relating to violations of the law. The ABA Task
Force on Corporate Responsibility recommended this year that some legal roles should be exempted from any obligation to "report out" violations of law, including through a noisy withdrawal. 44 The clearest case
arose, it said, when the lawyer "has been engaged by the organization to
investigate whether an organizational constituent has committed a material violation of law or a breach of duty to the organization." 45 This setting of internal corporate investigations is, of course, precisely the ex post
context. When the corporation's lawyer is functioning in this capacity,
the ABA Task Force concluded that the corporation "has an especially
compelling need for the ground rules of that investigation to promote
open and frank communications between the investigating lawyer and organizational constituents. ' 4 6 The ABA Task Force may well be right that
greater confidentiality is needed in these circumstances and that a carefully crafted exemption should apply to internal corporate investigations.
But to reach this conclusion is in essence to accept the ex ante/ex post
distinction and concede that ex ante communications are less likely to be
chilled by a limited obligation to report out.
Finally and most importantly, the principal practical effect of imposing gatekeeper obligations on attorneys is that a client who has been advised by an attorney that contemplated action is unlawful now has greater
reason to heed that attorney's advice-again precisely to the extent that
the client believes that the attorney may be under a legal obligation to
report material misconduct (either within the corporation or outside to
the SEC). Thus, even if it were true that clients would consult their lawyers less often, this impact could be more than fully offset by the fact that
it would become more dangerous to disregard the lawyers' advice. Add
to this mix the likelihood that ex ante advice will not be chilled, and the
net impact is to increase the attorney's leverage over the client by making
it more dangerous to ignore the attorney's advice. If law compliance is
the goal, such an impact seems socially desirable. Put simply, the logical
remedy for gatekeeper failure is to empower the gatekeeper, and a noisy
44. See ABA Task Force on Corporate Governance, supra note 6, at 59-60.
45. Id. at 59.
46. Id. The ABA Task Force also recommended that a lawyer defending the
corporation against criminal or civil charges be similarly exempted. A lawyer operating in
this capacity is, of course, a classic advocate and probably should not be expected to
perform a gatekeeping role.
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withdrawal obligation makes it more costly for the client to ignore the
lawyer.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE GATEKEEPER ROLE OF ATTORNEYS

Although the debate over section 307 to date has been dominated by
the issue of noisy withdrawal, the scope of section 307 is far broader.
What else can or should the SEC do to make the attorney an effective
guardian of the integrity of publicly filed disclosure documents (without
imposing obligations that subordinate the attorney's duty of loyalty to the
client to this mission)? This Essay will make three proposals: (1) a due
diligence obligation; (2) an independence requirement; and (3) an attorney certification requirement. Each is premised on A.A. Sommer's normative claim that the securities attorney must behave in some respects
less like an advocate and more like an auditor, 47 but each proposal also
recognizes that the attorney cannot undertake an obligation to audit its
client.
A. The Due Diligence Obligation
Few norms are less controversial among securities attorneys than that
they should perform some due diligence in preparing prospectuses or
other disclosure documents. Yet no SEC rule actually requires this.
Thus, a logical first step would be for the SEC's Rules of Practice to mandate due diligence by the attorney (within the time realistically available)
in the preparation of disclosure documents. Indeed, such an obligation
sounds very much like a "minimum standard of professional conduct"
that section 307 authorizes. Why? Because it is semantically impossible
to assert that an attorney who has behaved in a grossly negligent fashion
has behaved "professionally." Interestingly, in its existing Rules of Practice, the SEC already holds auditors to precisely such a standard and asserts the power to suspend or disbar them for merely negligent conduct. 48 If this can be done, then it seems to follow a fortiori, after the

enactment of section 307, that the SEC could require attorneys to take
reasonable steps to investigate the accuracy of statements made in documents that they prepare. 49 The impact of such a rule is to give fair notice
47. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
48. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(iv) (2002) (specifying that two forms of "negligent
conduct"-either "[a] single instance of highly unreasonable conduct" or "[riepeated
instances of unreasonable conduct"-could trigger sanctions under Rule 102(e)).
49. The attorney would, of course, be entitled to rely on the auditor with respect to
financial information certified by the auditor, as in the case of the "reliance on an expert"
defense under section 11(b)(3)(C) of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(k) (b) (3) (C) (2000). In addition, such a rule would not require the attorney to verify
or corroborate every material fact in the disclosure document, but only to take reasonable
steps to seek corroboration of facts or claims that otherwise seem unsupported or
suspicious. In many cases, a certification by an appropriate corporate officer could satisfy
the obligation (if the officer had personal knowledge).
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to the attorney that he or she cannot simply rely on the client's assertions,
but must perform at least some minimal examination to corroborate
those assertions, whose depth and intensity would basically be determined by the profession's own norms and standards.
By no means is it here suggested that negligence should support a
private cause of action under Rule lOb-5 against attorneys (or others).50
But negligence is improper professional conduct, which should in appropriate cases justify the imposition of sanctions under section 307.51 Such
a tradeoff-i.e., public liability but not private liability for negligenceagain seems desirable in that it enhances deterrence without threatening
insolvency for law firms.
B. Independence
Auditors, of course, must be independent of their client, and SEC
rules have long defined tests for auditor independence. Increasingly, a
new literature has warned that attorneys are becoming too economically
intertwined with their clients, as a result, in part, of the increasing practice of law firms taking (and even demanding) equity stakes in the client
in return for professional services. 5 2 If some level of independence is
necessary for an attorney to function as a gatekeeper (as A.A. Sommer, Jr.
recognized over a quarter century ago), SEC rules of professional conduct could define these limits. To illustrate, a law firm that holds in its
portfolio ten percent of the corporate client's equity (or, alternatively,
equity in the client equal to ten percent of its own net asset value) will
probably be a poor, or at least a biased, monitor.
Perhaps the context that is most sensitive and would most benefit
from such rules is that of internal corporate investigations. Should the
corporation's normal outside counsel perform such an investigation? Or
should SEC rules define the level of independence necessary to conduct
such a sensitive inquiry? Absent SEC action, individual state bar associations will either do nothing (the most likely outcome) or prescribe differ50. Not only will negligence not be sufficient to support an action under Rule 10b-5,
see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (requiring scienter), but the
SEC's Rules of Practice, which section 307 addresses only in terms of authorizing
additional SEC rulemaking, would not under existing precedents give rise to a private
cause of action. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979)
(declining to imply private cause of action under section 17 (a) of Securities Exchange Act
of 1934).
51. Historically, the SEC did once hold attorneys liable for professional negligence in
"aiding and abetting" cases. See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir.
1973). This has no longer been possible since the Supreme Court mandated a scienter
standard in Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193, but sanctions for professional misconduct could
look to a similar negligence standard.
52. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer
Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 405, 408-10 (2002);
see also Royce de R. Barondes, Professionalism Consequences of Law Firm Investments in
Clients: An Empirical Assessment, 39 Am. Bus. L.J. 379, 380 (2002).
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ent and inconsistent standards, thereby creating needless disparities.
Uniform standards for corporate internal investigations are desirable and
as a practical matter can come only from the SEC. There is no need to
offer precise rules here, only to recognize that professionals are expected
to be independent of their clients. Accordingly, the SEC should read
section 307 to grant it authority to define the point at which the attorney
is not sufficiently independent of the client to perform certain sensitive
tasks.
C. Attorney Certification
Today, the auditor certifies the firm's financial results, and under
Sarbanes-Oxley, senior management certifies that the financial information in periodic reports filed with the SEC "fairly presents in all material
respects" the firm's financial condition and results of operations. 53 Even
the securities analyst must now certify that its recommendations reflect
the analyst's own personal views. 54 Alone, the attorney escapes and need
not certify in any way as to the accuracy of the client's disclosures. Yet,
traditionally, the attorney is the field marshall of the disclosure process.
More importantly, because the auditor's certificate covers only the financial statements that it reviews, no independent professional today expresses any view that the statements made in the textual portions of a
Form 10-K or a registration statement are correct or have at least been
subjected to a reasonable "due diligence" examination by the professional. Yet increasingly, the most important statements made by a corporate issuer are those set forth in its "Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations" (MD&A).55 If after
the Enron-era scandals we are concerned about the quality and reliability
of the financial disclosures reaching the market, one of the most obvious,
logical, and necessary steps would be to insert a gatekeeper into the disclosure process at exactly this stage and require some professional vetting
of the issuer's textual statements.
Still, there remains a problem with this proposal that requires it to be
downsized significantly. Put simply, what can the attorney reasonably be
asked to certify? After all, the attorney has not audited the client; nor is a
law firm organizationally or logistically equipped for any form of inquiry
analogous to an audit. Nonetheless, a less onerous form of certification
53. Both sections 302 and 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act require certifications by both
a covered corporation's chief executive officer and chief financial officer that the
"financial information included in the report ... fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer ...." 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (a) (3)
(West Supp. 2003). Section 906 has been codified as part of the federal criminal code and
carries up to a twenty-year sentence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350.
54. See Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 33-8186, 17 C.F.R.
§ 242 (2003); see also Andrew Countryman, SEC Adopts New Rule on Analyst Assurance,
Chi. Trib., Feb. 7, 2003, at N3 (discussing Regulation AC).
55. See Item 303 of Regulation S-K. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
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seems possible. Based on the opinions normally delivered by attorneys in
registered offerings in the securities market, it would seem justifiable to
ask the attorney principally responsible for preparing a disclosure document or report filed with the SEC to certify: (1) that such attorney believes the statements made in the document or report to be true and
correct in all material respects; and (2) that such attorney is not aware of
any additional material information whose disclosure is necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
56
which they were made, not misleading.
In essence, this proposed certification simply tracks the language of
Rule 10b-5. Far from intruding significantly into the marketplace, this
obligation only generalizes existing practices in the private market. Today, in most public underwritten offerings, issuer's counsel delivers an
opinion to the underwriters-sometimes called a "negative assurance"
opinion-stating that it is not "aware" of any material information required to be disclosed that has not been disclosed. 5 7 In this light, such a
negative certification requirement would simply mandate for 1934 Act
periodic filings what is already done by the private issuers in the primary
market for 1933 Act disclosure documents. The marginal difference is
56. Issues could arise as to which attorney was principally responsible for preparing a
document. The simplest answer to this issue is to require the corporation to disclose the
identity of such attorney in the filing and then require that attorney's certification. The
real thrust of this proposal is to require the issuer to subject its principal disclosure
documents to the review of an attorney who would be subject to SEC sanctions for
professional negligence. This author would not require the attorney to be an outside
counsel (although others might think that such an additional requirement was also
justified).
57. For a description of this standard opinion in registered public offerings, see
Richard R. Howe, The Duties and Liabilities of Attorneys in Rendering Legal Opinions,
1989 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 283, 287. Mr. Howe, a partner at the NewYork firm of Sullivan &
Cromwell, properly observes that "such opinions are not really 'legal opinions' at all in that
they do not state any legal conclusion but only say that the attorney believes certain facts to
be true." Id. Precisely for this reason, such an opinion is more a pledge of the law firm's
reputational capital, which the underwriters demand. The counsel giving such opinion
does not purport to conclude that all information required to be disclosed has been
disclosed (as an auditor might by analogy), but only that it lacks personal knowledge or
belief as to any such failure. See also RonaldJ. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:
Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale L.J. 239, 291 (1984) (also describing such opinions);
Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal
Whistleblowing Rules, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 221, 226-27 & n.19 (1995) (discussing
judicial interpretation of such opinions). The American Bar Association has characterized
this type of opinion as a "negative assurance" and finds such opinions to be "unique to
securities offerings." See ABA Comm'n on Legal Opinions, Third-Party Legal Opinion
Report, Including the Legal Opinion Accord, of the Section of Business Law, 47 Bus. Law.
167, 228 (1991). Although the ABA considers it generally inappropriate for attorneys to
request such "negative assurance" opinions from other attorneys, the special context of
securities offerings is exempted, reflecting the fact that underwriters consider such an
assurance to be necessary to them. That the ABA, as the representative of the bar,
"disfavors" such opinions because of the demands they place on the attorney probably only
underscores their value.
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that, in the case of periodic filings under the Securities Exchange Act,
there is no private party in a position analogous to the underwriter who
can demand such an opinion or certification from the attorney. SEC action would fill this void. The one respect in which this proposal does
change current practice is that it would require that some attorneywhether inside or outside the corporation-assume responsibility for supervising the preparation of the disclosure document. 58 Thus, it effectively requires the involvement of a gatekeeper and precludes internal
corporate personnel from filing a Form 10-K or Form 10-Q without some
review by counsel.
Beyond this structural value, such a requirement would have a
profound symbolic and psychological effect on the bar because it would
establish the attorney's obligations as a gatekeeper. Potentially, the SEC
could go even further and require the certifying attorney responsible for
the disclosure document to certify that the attorney believed adequate
disclosure had been made "after making such inquiry that the attorney
reasonably believed appropriate in the circumstance." This would integrate the certification requirement with the earlier discussed due diligence obligation. As here proposed, either in-house counsel or an
outside attorney could provide such certification, but either would be
subject to a due diligence obligation.
Admittedly, limits need to be recognized on what an attorney can
certify. Because the attorney does not audit its client, the attorney should
not be asked to certify the accuracy and completeness of all information
disclosed in SEC filings. Thus, the proposal here made requires only a
negative certification that the attorney had no reason to believe, and did
not believe, that the information was materially false or misleading. Legally, such a certification would trigger "aiding and abetting" liability that
the SEC could enforce if the attorney knew of the materially false or misleading information, 59 and it could even trigger criminal liability under
various federal statutes. 60 But its primary effect is to mandate that an
58. A major question surrounds whether this certification should be given by an
inside counsel, such as the general counsel, or an independent outside firm. As noted
earlier, the general counsel has a "one client" practice and thus does not make a natural
gatekeeper. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. On the other hand, requiring use
of an outside law firm will increase the costs of compliance with SEC disclosure
requirements for many corporations.
59. As part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, section 20(e) was
added to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to expressly authorize the SEC to sue "any
person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of a
provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued under this chapter." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(e) (2000). Thus, although private persons cannot sue an aider and abetter, the SEC
can.
60. The attorney can be held criminally liable under the federal "aiding and abetting"
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Or, the attorney could be held liable for securities fraud
because now the attorney has made his or her own "attributed statement." Under the
Central Bank decision, a secondary participant can be held liable-both civilly and
criminally-for the statements that it makes itself. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
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attorney serve as a gatekeeper for investors with respect to important disclosure documents.
Still other rules may be desirable, dealing with more specific
problems. 6 1 This discussion has not been intended to be exhaustive or to
offer precise rules, but rather to advance a more general proposition: To
the extent that the quality of disclosure declined in the 1990s, the most
logical response is to identify a gatekeeper who can be asked to play a
more active role in monitoring the issuer's disclosures. This is not a role
that attorneys will want to play because it does impose costs on them, but
it is a role they may be obliged to play because the social costs of allowing
them to escape responsibility are even higher.

Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (stating that any "lawyer,
accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement
(or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary
violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule lOb5 are met").
61. An example of additional standards of professional conduct that the SEC might
adopt involves the ongoing controversy over "pay-to-play" in securities class actions.
Plaintiffs' firms that specialize in securities class actions increasingly make political
contributions to elected state and municipal officials, usually controllers, who have
discretionary control over public pension funds, in order that they can use the pension
funds as "lead plaintiffs" to win the lucrative position of class counsel. Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the plaintiff with the largest stake in the action is
made the presumptive lead plaintiff and is entitled to choose class counsel. See section
21D(a) (3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B). Normally,
public pension funds are the largest investor willing to assume this role, and one
motivation for their doing so is the elected state official's desire to obtain political
contributions. This problem has been noted by courts, journalists, and student law review
notes. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 270 n.49 (3d Cir. 2001);
Malcolm P. Heinicke, Note, The ABA Should Not Delay on Pay-to-Play: Regulating the
Political Contributions of Lawyers to Government Officials Who Award Legal Contracts, 49
Stan. L. Rev. 1523 (1997); Kevin McCoy, Campaign Contributions or Conflicts of Interest?,
USA Today, Sept. 11, 2001, at BI. The injury to investors is either that the lead plaintiff
will pick an inferior class counsel or, more likely, acquiesce in excessive counsel fees.
Arguably, the SEC could bar attorneys or firms that make such contributions from
representing the pension fund for a one or two year period thereafter. The SEC long ago
adopted such a prophylactic rule in the case of investment bankers who make political
contributions in order to obtain managing underwriter status for municipal bond
offerings. In the mid-1990s, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board adopted Rule G37, which bars a broker-dealer firm that has made such contributions from acting as an
underwriter for the jurisdiction's bonds for a defined period. See Self-Regulating
Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board Relating to Consultants, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-36727,
61 Fed. Reg. 1955 (Jan. 24, 1996); see generally Jon B. Jordan, The Regulation of Pay-toPlay and the Influence of Political Contributions in the Municipal Securities Industry, 1999
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 489. Presumably, what is unethical for investment bankers is also
unethical for lawyers, and a similar rationale would justify a similar rule. Still, a
jurisdictional issue arises here as to whether the securities class action plaintiff's lawyer is
.appearing" or "practicing" before the Commission, as required under section 307 before
the SEC obtains jurisdiction, when the attorney litigates a securities class action in federal
court.
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CONCLUSION

This Essay has moved from the diagnosis that gatekeepers failed investors during the late 1990s to the prescription that, in order to align the
gatekeepers' incentives with those of investors, two strategies need to be
pursued: deterrence and empowerment. Deterrence is easy, but empowerment is more complex. The latter requires new aspirational duties and
new ethical standards, even if they will be only rarely enforced. Today, it
is not only anomalous but irrational that the auditor and analyst are
closely regulated and required to certify, while the attorney is not.
Although this Essay by no means advocates the federalization of most
professional rules of ethics applicable to securities attorneys, it does recognize that guild-like regulation by state bar associations will not establish
meaningful gatekeeping standards for securities attorneys. Indeed, bar
association enforcement of ethical rules has never deterred, and probably
will never deter, the bar. The blunt truth is that private self-regulation of
attorneys through bar associations means the continued government of
the guild, by the guild, and for the guild. Unless relatively uniform
norms are clearly established, gatekeeper failure is likely to remain the
prevailing pattern because the client's inevitable pressure on the gatekeeper is not matched by countervailing regulatory pressure. SEC rules
thus offer the best prospect for a relevant, precise response that avoids
pointless disparity while clearly notifying securities attorneys that-like it
or not-they are gatekeepers.
To paraphrase Clemenceau, professions are too important to be left
to the professionals.

